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Abstract 
The	 oil	 palm	 industry	 in	 Indonesia,	which	has	undergone	dramatic	
growth	 since	 the	 1980s,	 has	 brought	 serious	 social	 unrest	 to	 local	
communities.	Given	 the	need	 to	deliver	 fresh	 fruit	bunches	 (FFB)	of	
palm	oil	to	a	crude	palm	oil	(CPO)	mill	within	24	hours	after	its	harvest,	
an	oil	palm	mill	requires	at	least	4,000	hectares	of	land	in	a	limited	area,	
and	more	commonly	10,000	 to	40,000	hectares,	 to	achieve	a	profit.	To	
acquire	 such	 large	parcels	 of	 land,	 the	oil	palm	 industry	has	utilized	
local	community	 leaders,	 sometimes	as	agents,	 sometimes	as	recipients	
of	bribes.	Ordinary	 local	 residents	have	 rarely	been	 involved	 in	 the	
first	stage	of	development,	and	their	right	to	the	communal	land,	where	
such	oil	palm	plantations	were	being	developed,	has	been	denied.	These	
conditions	have	 led	many	people	to	perceive	 inequities	 in	the	situation,	
and,	 especially	after	Suharto’s	 resignation	 in	1998,	 they	have	claimed	
their	 rights	 to	 the	 land	 and	demanded	more	 equitable	 distribution	
of	benefits.	However,	 they	have	often	been	 subject	 to	violence	 from	
military	personnel	recruited	by	oil	palm	companies	to	work	as	security	
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guards.	In	this	case	study	of	the	communal	land	struggle	associated	with	
the	oil	palm	 industry	 in	Kapar,	West	Sumatra,	 I	will	discuss	 the	social	
background	of	the	conflict	among	local	residents,	customary	law	leaders,	
regional	government	and	the	police-military.		Incidents	of	violence	have	
increased	as	the	dominant	groups	have	retaliated	against	villagers	who	
criticize	 the	process	of	 the	transfer	of	communal	 land	to	 the	company;	
moreover,	mobile	brigades,	regional	police	and	preman	 (hoodlum)	gangs	
have	been	brought	 in	to	silence	protests,	 including	demonstrations	and	
the	theft	of	FFB.		I	will	explore	the	causes	of	violence	during	the	era	of	
regional	autonomy	that	has	accompanied	Reformasi	(Reform).		
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BPN	(Badan Pertanahan Nasional,	National	Land	Bureau)	
BRIMOB	(Brigade Mobile,	Mobile	Brigade)	
CPO	(Crude	Palm	Oil)	
DPRD	(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah,	Regional	Assembly)	
FFB	(Fresh	fruit	bunches)	
KKPA	(Kredit Kepada Koperasi Primer Untuk Anggotanya,	Credit	for	the	
Members	of	Primary	Cooperatives)	
KUD	(Koperasi Uni Desa,	Village	Unit	Cooperative)	
LBH	(Lembaga Bantuan Hukum,	Institute	of	Legal	Aid)	
PEMDA	(Pemerintah Daerah,	regional	government)	
PIR	(Perkebunan Inti Rakyat,	Nucleus	Estate,	plantation	estates	managed	
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PKI	(Partai Komunis Indonesia,	Indonesian	Communist	Party)	
PKO	(Palm	Kernel	Oil)	
POLRES	(Polisi RESORT,	regional	police	at	district	level)	
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POLSEK	(Polisi Sektor,	regional	police	at	sub-district	level)	
	
Glossary of Indonesian Words: 
Adat	(customary	law)	
HGU	(Hak Guna Usaha,	right	of	land	exploitation)	
Kelompok Tani	(Farmers’	Association)	
Ninik Mamak	(matrilineal	clan	adat	leaders)	
Nagari	(Minangkabau	village	based	on	matrilineal	clans)	
Preman	(Hoodlums)	
Sidodali	(A	dominant	farmers’	association	in	Kapar)	
Siriah-Jariah	(Compensation	for	communal	land	exploitation)	
Tunas Mekar	(The	minority	farmers’	association	in	Kapar)	
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Introduction 
In	the	early	2000s,	Indonesian	palm	products	constituted	1.5% -2%	of	the	
country’s	GDP,	while	national	 crude	palm	oil	 (CPO)	output	comprised	
30 %	of	the	total	palm	oil	produced	worldwide,	second	only	to	Malaysia	
which	comprised	50%	(Barlow,	Zen	and	Gondowarsito	2003:14).	However,	
Indonesia	has	recently	surpassed	Malaysia,	producing	17.4	million	tons	in	
2007	to	Malaysia’s	15.82	million	tons.	Indonesian	producers	expect	crude	
palm	output	to	top	18	million	tons	in	2008,	due	to	the	fact	that	more	palm	
oil	trees	are	maturing	and	there	is	an	expansion	of	plantation	land.	The	
Indonesian	government’s	 forecast	 for	2009	production	 is	slightly	below	
the	producers’	forecast	of	20	million	tons.1	
	 Barlow	et	al.	 concluded	that	 the	growth	of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	
slowed	amidst	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	democratic	 reforms	of	 the	 late	
1990s,	 the	 chief	 problems	being	 capital	 scarcity,	 land	disputes	 and	
security	concerns.		I	concur	with	their	conclusion	that	both	land	disputes	
and	the	security	situation	have	worsened	since	the	financial	crisis	of	1997	
and	1998	and	Suharto’s	fall	 in	1998;	however,	I	would	 like	to	emphasize	
that	the	Indonesian	oil	palm	industry	has	returned	to	an	expansion	mode	
since	2002.	
	 According	 to	 analysis	 by	 Profundo,	 an	 NGO	 based	 in	 the	
Netherlands,	 the	main	reason	 for	decelerated	growth	 in	the	Indonesian	
oil	palm	industry	between	1998	and	2002	was	the	investment	slump	(van	
Gelder,	2004:	25).		However,	by	2002	and	certainly	by	the	first	half	of	2003,	
the	tide	seems	to	have	turned	for	the	Indonesian	oil	palm	sector.	 	CPO	
and	PKO	(palm	kernel	oil)	prices	on	the	world	market	have	recovered	
and	the	rupiah	has	appreciated	somewhat	relative	to	the	dollar.		Almost	
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all	 oil	palm	operations	are	profitable	again	 (ibid:	 25-27).	 	According	 to	
the	Commodity	 Intelligence	Report	2006	of	 the	USDA	 (United	States	
Department	of	Agriculture),	one	 factor	behind	the	rapid	recent	growth	
of	the	oil	palm	industry	in	Indonesia2	is	the	fact	that	new	regions	on	the	
islands	of	Sumatra,	Borneo,	Sulawesi	and	West	Papua	that	were	planted	
in	recent	years	are	now	coming	 into	production,	 reflecting	a	7-8	year	
lag	 time	period	between	the	 initial	planting	of	 the	palms	and	the	 first	
harvest	of	fruit.
	 As	the	rapid	expansion	of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	after	2002	would	
tend	to	exacerbate	the	problems	of	land	disputes	and	decreasing	security	
that	were	mentioned	 in	 the	work	of	Barlow	et	al.,	we	need	to	analyze	
these	problems	 in	detail	as	well	as	the	 impact	of	Reformasi	 (reform)	at	
the	regional	level	after	Suharto’s	resignation	in	1998.
1 Oil Palm Development and Land Disputes 
1-1 Land Disputes and Security 
	 Barlow	et	 al.	 commented	 on	 security	 concerns	 in	 the	 oil	 palm	
industry	from	1997	to	2002	as	follows	(ibid:14):
Security	 has	 become	 an	 even	more	 serious	 issue	 during	 this	
period,	with	an	overall	average	of	5% -10%	of	estates’	crops	stolen	
at	night	in	the	early	2000s,	especially	from	areas	near	villages	and	
public	roads.		Moreover,	most	thieves	are	outsiders,	law	and	order	
cannot	be	guaranteed,	and	police	and	 local	officers	are	sometimes	
connected	with	 the	robberies.	 	Thus	 the	need	 for	security	raises	
production	costs	by	some	US $	5/ton.	
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	 Robbery	of	plantation	products	has	been	a	great	 concern	 since	
Dutch	 colonial	 times.	 	According	 to	Ann	 Stoler	 (1995,	 chap.	 3~5),	
robberies	were	carried	out	not	only	by	the	plantation	staff	for	personal	
gains,	but	also	by	squatter	villagers	living	off	the	plantations.		One	report	
of	a	village	unit	cooperative	admitted	that	some	villagers	were	involved	
in	the	theft	of	FFB.3	 	 It	 is	not	my	 intention	to	 imply	that	 the	villagers	
whom	I	will	analyze	in	this	essay	are	involved	in	such	activities;	however,	
I	wish	 to	emphasize	 that	security	problems	have	resulted	 in	growing	
tensions	among	the	villagers,	companies,	 local	government	and	military-
police.		
	 Two	Indonesian	NGO	activists4	 identified	 five	reasons,	as	 follows,	
for	the	conflict	between	the	local	people	and	the	plantation	companies	at	
a	workshop	held	in	2007	in	Japan.5	(1)	The	oil	palm	plantation	companies	
would	not	acknowledge	the	people’s	right	 to	 their	communal	 lands.	 (2)	
Development	plans	 for	 oil	 palm	plantations	have	been	 implemented	
without	gaining	the	consensus	of	 local	people.	 (3)	Plantation	companies	
have	manipulated	 and	 sometimes	bribed	 local	 leaders	 to	help	 them	
acquire	 the	 land	 for	plantations;	moreover,	 people	had	no	 chance	 to	
discuss	their	plans	at	the	first	stage	of	development.	 (4)	The	companies	
and	 the	people	have	 a	very	different	notion	 of	 the	meaning	of	 land	
“contracts.”	The	companies	assume	that	they	have	the	right	to	develop	
oil	palm	plantations	anywhere	 in	 the	area	designated	 in	a	 “contract,”	
while	the	people,	especially	when	the	land	is	thought	to	be	communally	
owned	as	in	the	case	of	West	Sumatra,	have	not	acknowledged	that	they	
sold	the	land.	(5)	Those	who	initiate	protests	often	face	violent	responses	
from	the	police-military	and	from	companies.
	 I	agree	with	their	summaries	of	causes	of	conflict,	but	I	 think	we	
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need	to	analyze	the	characteristics	of	conflict	 in	more	detail	 through	a	
careful	case	study.		A	report	entitled	Losing Ground	(2008)	described	513	
incidents	of	active	conflict	between	companies	and	communities	in	the	oil	
palm	plantation	sector	in	Indonesia	in	2008.		These	incidents	involved	135	
companies	 (both	private	and	state-owned)	 from	23	major	oil	plantation	
groups.		According	to	Losing Ground,	there	might	be	as	many	as	1,000	
communities	embroiled	 today	 in	oil	palm	related	conflicts	 in	 Indonesia	
(Friends	of	the	Earth,	Life	Mosaic	and	Sawit	Watch,	2008:	38).		
	 The	people’s	right	to	communal	land	is	outlined	in	article	3	and	5	of	
The	Principle	Law	of	Agriculture	(Undang-undang Pokok Agraria),	1960.	
Although	the	Sukarno	regime	nationalized	Dutch	companies	in	1957,	they	
were	said	to	have	paid	attention	to	the	people’s	rights	to	communal	land.	
Nevertheless,	the	subsequent	Suharto	regime	passed	the	Basic	Forestry	
Law	in	1967	 (Undang-undang No. 5. 1967)	and	made	 it	possible	 for	the	
government	and	military	to	utilize	the	people’s	communal	 land	without	
compensation.	 	People	had	to	remain	silent	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	violence	
and	terror	of	the	New	Order	period.	 	Furthermore,	a	Regulation	of	the	
Ministry	of	Inner	Affairs	in	1999	(Peraturan Menteri Negara, No. 5, 1999),	
which	basically	admitted	the	people’s	right	to	communal	land,	prescribes	
that	this	right	does	not	 include	HGUs	 (right	of	 land	exploitation)	which	
had	been	designated	prior	 to	 the	 regulation	 (Syahmunir,	 2002:	 21-29).	
Many	people	were	very	disappointed	 in	 this	 regulation,	 because	 it	
made	 it	difficult	 to	make	 legitimate	claims.	 	 In	2005,	 the	government	
released	a	presidential	regulation	 (Perpres	No.	36/2005),	which	allowed	
the	government	to	force	the	release	of	land	when	deemed	in	the	public	
interest.	 	This	 regulation	was	enacted	 to	ease	 implementation	of	 the	
Kalimantan	Border	Oil	Palm	Mega	Project.	(Wakker,	2006:	4)	
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	 In	this	article,	I	will	discuss	a	 land	dispute	concerning	an	oil	palm	
plantation	and	its	CPO	mill,	both	located	in	West	Pasaman	District.	The	
oil	palm	operation	is	a	subsidiary	of	the	Wilmar	group.6
1-2 Violence
The	expansion	of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	 in	 Indonesia	has	 triggered	a	
number	of	serious	 issues,	 including	deforestation,	 forest	fires	and	social	
conflicts	 (Friends	of	 the	Earth	Netherlands	and	Sawit	Watch	Indonesia,	
2004:	 6-8).	Losing Ground	 (2008)	 reported	details	 of	 violence	 toward	
residents	as	 follows:	 incidents	of	 torture	 (479	residents	and	activists	 in	
41	conflict	incidents),	killings	(12	residents	in	14	incidents),	shootings	(134	
residents	 in	21	cases),	abductions	 (25	residents	 in	7	cases),	arrests	 (936	
residents	in	77	cases),	and	arson	(284	houses	or	huts	in	25	cases).		
	 When	 I	was	 in	West	Sumatra	 in	 2008,	 I	 learned	of	 a	 shooting7	
of	 a	 suspected	FFB	 thief	 in	Kinali,	West	Pasaman.8	 Singgalangg,	 a	
local	newspaper	 in	West	Sumatra,	broke	 the	story	of	 the	shooting	by	
a	BRIMOB	 (mobile	 brigade)	 officer.	According	 to	 Singgalang,	when	
Risdianti,	a	farmer	in	Kinali,	10	kilometers	southwest	of	Kapar,	was	riding	
a	motorcycle	on	the	evening	of	February	13th	along	the	border	of	PMJ	
oil	palm	plantation	(PT	Peputra	Maha	Jaya),	he	was	told	to	stop	by	two	
military	officers	who	were	patrolling	as	security	guards	of	the	company.	
The	officers	accused	him	of	 stealing	FFB,	although	Risdianti	 strongly	
denied	the	accusation,	and	they	suddenly	shot	him	in	his	left	leg.		He	was	
left	on	the	spot	for	two	hours,	and	then	carried	to	a	hospital	by	the	two	
men,	who	had	returned	to	his	side.	 	The	shooting	was	not	made	public	
until	Singgalang	reported	it	two	weeks	after	the	incident.	
	 This	 incident	provides	many	significant	 implications.	Even	 if	 the	
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two	security	guards	who	accused	Risdianti	of	FFB	theft	had	“evidence”	
--	and	 there	must	have	been	some	FFB	thefts	occurring	 then	on	 the	
plantation	--	 they	should	not	have	shot	him	without	warning.	 	 It	was	
very	curious	that	they	left	him	to	suffer	for	two	hours	at	the	spot.	What	
were	their	activities	during	these	hours?	In	addition,	why	were	BRIMOB	
officers	working	as	company	security	guards?9	Risdianti	was	hospitalized	
for	 two	weeks,	and	 it	was	reported	 that	his	 left	 leg	might	have	 to	be	
amputated;	the	question	of	who	should	pay	the	hospital	expenditures	was	
still	pending.		
	 The	 regent	 of	West	Pasaman	District	was	 reported	 to	be	very	
angry	about	 the	 incident.	He	expressed	his	regrets	 to	 the	victim,	and	
stated	 that	 the	 two	military	officers	 should	be	punished	according	 to	
state	law.		Nevertheless,	there	is	no	question	that	it	was	the	regent	and	
his	government	who	 initiated	 the	development	of	oil	palm	plantations	
in	his	district.	As	Pasaman	District	 relies	on	oil	palm	plantations	 for	
58 %	of	 its	general	 income,10	 the	regent	and	DPRD	(regional	assembly)	
of	Pasaman	continued	to	support	those	companies	rather	than	confront	
them	over	 incidents	 like	this	 (Afrizal,	2005:	130-31).	 	To	understand	this	
incident	we	need	 to	 analyze	various	 aspects	 of	 the	general	 oil	 palm	
conflict	in	detail:	Who	is	fighting	whom	and	what	kinds	of	interests	are	in	
dispute?	
	
2 Oil Palm Developments in West Pasaman 
According	 to	Tables	 1	 and	 2,	 the	 total	 production	 of	CPO	 in	West	
Sumatra	 in	 2004	was	686,356	 tons	and	 the	plantation	area	measured	
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280,099	hectares,	while	 the	 total	oil	palm	production	of	West	Pasaman	
District	was	252,038	tons,	with	a	plantation	area	of	93,602	hectares.		This	
means	that	West	Pasaman	accounted	for	nearly	36%	of	the	total	oil	palm	
production	of	West	Sumatra,	and	the	planted	area	for	oil	palm	plantations	
in	West	 Pasaman	 comprised	 33 %	 of	 the	 total	 in	West	 Sumatra.	
Therefore,	we	can	 say	 that	West	Pasaman	 is	 the	oil	palm	plantation	
belt	of	West	Sumatra.11	 	Tables	3	and	4	 indicate	 the	planted	area	and	
production	of	oil	palm	plantations	 in	 Indonesia	as	a	whole.	 In	 terms	of	
planted	area,	West	Sumatra	comprised	only	6.3%	of	Indonesia’s	total,	but	
it	accounted	for	11.9%	of	total	production,	according	to	2004	statistics.		
	 Although	there	are	plans	to	develop	14,500	hectares	of	new	oil	palm	
plantations	in	West	Sumatra,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	land	area	
available	 for	oil	palm	plantations	has	nearly	reached	 its	 limit.	The	 land	
used	for	oil	palm	plantations	in	West	Sumatra	is	designated	as	“communal	
land”	(tanah ulayat),12	while	that	of	oil	palm	plantations	in	other	provinces	
consists	of	 state	 land	and	communal	 land.13	 	Communal	 land	has	been	
an	 important	resource	 for	 the	Minangkabau	people,	not	only	 for	 their	
economic	life	but	also	to	buttress	their	identity	as	a	matrilineal	society.			
	 Indonesia’s	vice	president,	Jusuf	Kalla,	alluded	to	the	development	
of	communal	 land	 in	West	Sumatra	 in	some	rather	shocking	remarks	
made	in	June	2008	at	the	opening	ceremony	of	a	subsidiary	of	a	textile	
factory,	Japfa	Indonesia	Ltd.	 located	 in	Padang-Pariaman	District,	West	
Sumatra.14	He	stressed	 that	development	 in	West	Sumatra	was	much	
easier	 in	comparison	 to	 that	 in	other	provinces,	because,	he	said,	 the	
land	of	West	Sumatra	was	still	managed	as	communal	 land,	 so	 it	was	
merely	necessary	to	negotiate	with	village	leaders	to	achieve	permission	
to	develop	 the	 land.	He	continued	that	 it	was	rather	difficult	 to	reach	
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agreement	 in	other	provinces	 in	which	 the	 land	belongs	 to	 individual	
owners.		This	apparent	ignorance	of	the	communal	land	situation	in	West	
Sumatra	threatens	to	trigger	more	land	disputes	in	the	future.		
2-1 Oil Palm Development in Kapar and Sasak 
Kapar	and	Sasak	are	neighboring	nagari	 (villages	based	on	matrilineal	
clans)	 in	West	Pasaman	District	 located	200	kilometers	northwest	of	
Padang,	the	provincial	capital	of	West	Sumatra.		Kapar	has	a	total	 land	
area	of	 34.55	km2	and	a	population	 (as	of	 2002)	 of	 7,488,	while	Sasak	
totals	123.31	km2	in	area,	with	a	2007	population	of	14,143.		As	Sasak	is	a	
coastal	area	along	the	Indian	Ocean,	46%	of	its	workforce	is	engaged	in	
fishery,	while	60%	of	the	residents	of	Kapar	are	engaged	in	agriculture.15		
	 On	January	23,	1980,	a	letter	was	written	to	the	regent	of	Pasaman	
District	 by	 several	 ninik-mamak,	 or	matrilineal	 clan	 adat	 leaders,	
requesting	more	local	investment.		Kapar	was	ripe	for	development,	and	
development	would	bring	benefits	not	only	to	Kapar	but	also	to	the	state,	
the	letter	said.	At	the	same	time,	the	letter	stated	that	prior	agreement	
for	 any	development	plans	must	 be	 obtained	 from	all	 adat	 leaders,	
including	pucuk-adat and ninik-mamak.16	 	At	that	time,	 the	government	
and	 local	representatives	conceived	a	development	plan	to	create	new	
rice	fields	through	the	construction	of	an	irrigation	system	on	the	Batang	
Tongar	River,	but	the	plan	was	never	realized.		After	this	development	
plan	was	proposed,	a	meeting	was	held	on	April	3,	1981,	 to	discuss	the	
issue	of	 immigration	 to	Kapar.	 	 It	was	decided	 that	 the	village	adat	
council	 (KAN)	of	Kapar	would	 recognize	new	 immigrants,	 and	every	
immigrant	would	be	given	a	maximum	of	2	hectares	of	land	if	he	or	she	
paid	Rp	225,000	per	hectare.17		
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	 In	 the	 late	1980s	a	plan	was	 initiated	to	develop	private	oil	palm	
plantations	 in	Kapar	and	Sasak.	 	On	September	27,	1989,	 the	regent	of	
Pasaman	District	met	with	local	ninik-mamak	and	community	leaders	to	
discuss	the	plan	(Colchester,	Jiwan,	Andiko,	Sirait,	Firdaus,	Surambo	and	
Pane,	2006:	133).	On	August	13,	1990,	 the	village	adat	council	of	Kapar	
decided	to	utilize	communal	 land	as	the	site	of	an	oil	palm	plantation.18	
During	the	period	from	1990	to	1997,	2,400	hectares	of	the	communal	land	
of	Kapar	and	Sasak	were	transferred	to	PT	Permata	Hijan	Pasaman	(PHP	
I),	or	the	“Green	Jewel	of	Pasaman”19;	1600	hectares	from	the	communal	
land	of	Kapar	and	800	hectares	 from	that	Sasak.	 	On	March	15,	1997,	
PHP	I	and	the	adat	council	of	Kapar	reached	an	agreement	that	the	1600	
hectares	of	estate	land	would	be	divided	after	2001,	50%	for	smallholdings	
(known	as	plasma)	and	50%	for	nucleus	estates	(PIR).20	
	 The	Chronology of the Communal Land Issue of Nagari Kapar, 
Pasaman District21	revealed	how	the	communal	 land	of	Kapar	has	been	
“sold”	(in	the	words	of	the	document)	to	other	people,	agents	and	PHP.22	
It	is	quite	clear	that	Mr.	BJL,	the	former	adat	council	chairman	of	Kapar,	
played	a	key	role.23		
	 The	members	of	Tunas Mekar,	a	farmers’	association	in	Kapar	that	
has	 loudly	criticized	the	communal	 land	transactions,	provided	behind-
the-scenes	 information	about	 the	1997	agreement.	 	They	claimed	 that	
11	leading	figures	of	the	council	received	some	money	from	PHP,	which	
they	retained	 for	 their	own	use	and	never	used	 for	 the	village.24	From	
the	perspective	of	the	Minangkabau	adat	(customary	law),	this	money	is	
siriah-jariah,	or	compensation	 for	communal	 land	exploitation	 (see	note	
18).	As	mentioned	in	3-3,	the	village	leaders	themselves	did	not	intend	to	
sell	 the	communal	 land	of	Kapar,	yet	 they	promised	that	 the	company	
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would	be	 issued	 the	right	of	 land	exploitation	on	 their	estate.25	 	Even	
though	reception	of	this	money	does	not	constitute	a	contract	to	sell	their	
communal	land,	it	implies	serious	obligations	to	the	company.	
	 Before	PHP	was	officially	permitted	 to	 establish	 the	plantation	
in	1996,	a	 few	officials	of	 the	regional	government	of	Pasaman	District	
were	 said	 by	 local	 villagers	 to	 have	visited	 some	 of	 the	 leaders	 in	
Sasak	who	opposed	the	oil	palm	plantation,	and	to	have	 tried	 to	hand	
them	envelopes.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	envelopes	contained	some	money,	
and	to	receive	 the	envelopes	would	 in	effect	mean	they	agreed	to	 the	
development	plan.		In	contrast	to	the	situation	in	Kapar,	PHP	I	was	said	
to	have	paid	Rp	20,000	(US $	20)	per	hectare	to	the	Sasak	leaders	at	that	
time,	which	is	only	half	of	the	price	paid	in	the	Kapar	case.26
	 KUD Rantau Pasman Sasak,	one	of	the	two	village	unit	cooperatives	
of	 the	oil	palm	 industry	 in	Sasak,	 reported	 in	2005	 that	241	hectares	
had	not	been	planted	yet	from	the	total	area	of	714	hectares	for	plasma	
smallholdings.	The	report	emphasized	the	necessity	of	negotiating	with	
the	 company	 to	 resolve	 the	problem.	The	village	unit	 cooperatives	
comprise	 two	 farmers’	 associations	 with	 357	 households	 and	 the	
distribution	of	 the	benefits	among	the	members	appeared	to	me	to	be	
equitable	and	rational.27	
	 Local	residents	have	often	claimed	that	oil	palm	companies	renege	
on	their	promises	to	them.	Companies	are	able	to	cut	expenses	as	well	
as	gain	profits	by	allotting	more	 land	 for	nucleus	estates	and	 less	 for	
smallholders.	 	The	KUD	 (Village	Unit	Cooperative)	has	been	paying	
1%	of	 its	total	earnings	as	a	special	tax	to	benefit	the	village.	However,	
nucleus	estates	do	not	contribute	any	funds	directly	to	the	village,	paying	
only	the	required	government	taxes.	 	An	 increased	relative	number	of	
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plasma	smallholdings	would	mean	constrained	tax	revenues	for	the	local	
government	but	more	income	for	the	village.		Certainly,	companies	would	
prefer	to	avoid	paying	additional	monies	to	the	village	smallholders.		This	
is	one	of	the	factors	behind	the	residents’	complaint	about	“plasma omong 
kosong,”	or	plasma	based	on	empty	promises.28		And	it	is	another	cause	of	
conflict	between	residents	and	companies.29	
	
2-2 Differing Definitions of a “Contract” 
Although	acceptance	of	monetary	sums	as	high	as	Rp	700,000,000	 (US $	
300,000)	does	not	mean	that	 the	receivers	have	 finalized	a	contract	 to	
sell	 their	communal	 land	but	merely	 indicates	 that	 they	have	received	
compensation	for	communal	land	exploitation	based	on	the	Minangkabau	
adat,	 it	 is	quite	obvious	 that	 some	ninik-mamak	 (matrilineal	 clan	adat	
leaders)	 and	 the	regional	government	 in	Pasaman	District	authorized	
issuance	of	HGU	 (Hak Guna Usaha,	 right	of	 land	exploitation)	 to	PHP.	
The	issuance	of	HGU	is	not	a	contract	to	sell	the	land;	however,	the	land	
stipulated	by	the	 terms	of	HGU	could	be	controlled	nearly	 forever	by	
the	state.30	In	other	words,	although	from	a	legal	standpoint	HGU	is	not	
strictly	a	contract	to	sell	the	land,	the	impact	and	significance	of	issuing	
HGU	is	almost	the	same	as	selling	and	buying	land.	It	 is	not	surprising	
that	Tunas Mekar	members	often	criticize	the	process	of	issuing	HGU	to	
PHP	as	 improper,	 referring	to	 the	Minangkabau	customary	 law	which	
requires	a	meeting	of	all	village	members	if	the	village	wants	to	pledge	
(not	sell)	their	communal	land.		Only	pawning	(to	a	relative	in	the	same	
village)	 is	permitted;	 “selling”	the	communal	 land	of	a	village	 is	strictly	
prohibited.31	When	vice	president	Jusuf	Kalla	 said	 that	West	Sumatra	
could	claim	advantages	over	other	 regions	 in	development	due	 to	 its	
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communal	land	ownership,	he	totally	disregarded	the	voices	of	the	local	
people.32	
	 There	 were	 formerly	 22	 ninik-mamak	 members	 in	 Kapar;	
nevertheless	only	12	members	were	 responsible	 for	decision-making.	
The	other	10	ninik-mamak,	who	had	requested	 to	hold	a	village-wide	
meeting,	had	already	been	excluded	 from	the	decision-making	process	
of	 the	village	council.	 	They	were	not	 invited	 to	 important	meetings.	
These	facts	made	oil	palm	development	 in	Kapar	especially	contentious	
and	sometimes	brought	suffering	to	residents	who	criticized	the	process	
of	“selling	out.”33		HGU	was	issued	in	1996	to	PHP	by	the	National	Land	
Bureau.	This	allowed	 the	company	 to	exploit	 the	entire	area	of	 2400	
hectares;	at	 the	same	time	 it	meant	 that	 the	status	of	 land	ownership	
remained	uncertain.	
	 Minangkabau	villages	 are	divided	 into	 two	 types	 of	matrilineal	
clans:	Koto-Piliang	clans	and	Bodi-Caniago	clans.	Bodi-Caniago	clans	are	
fairly	democratically-oriented,	while	Koto-Piliang	clans	are	much	more	
feudalistic.34		As	Kapar	is	a	Koto-Piliang	village,	decision-making	tends	to	
be	more	feudalistic	than	that	in	villages	of	Bodi-Caniago	clans.		In	a	Koto-
Piliang	village	there	is	a	pucuk-adat	who	is	the	descendant	of	the	village	
founder,	and	who	used	to	be	the	most	powerful	member	in	his	village.		In	
Kapar	it	is	not	the	pucuk-adat	but	Mr.	BJL	who	used	to	be	most	powerful	
among	 the	adat	 leaders.	 	Mr.	BJL	was	a	ninik-mamak	 from	a	normal	
peasant	family.	He	dominated	KAN	with	his	relationship	to	the	military-
police,	government,	banks	and	business	people.	Later,	 in	 the	1980s,	he	
became	the	dominant	 figure	 in	 the	village	adat	council	 (KAN).	 	Many	
Kapar	residents	still	fear	him	today,	because	they	believe	he	has	sakti,	or	
magical	power.	
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	 An	 examination	 of	 the	 process	 of	 “selling”	 the	 communal	
land	 reveals	 some	critical	 issues.	 	PHP	promised	 to	designate	50 %	
of	 the	1600-hectare	plantation	as	nucleus	estates	 (PIR)	 and	50 %	as	
smallholdings.35	However,	 1200	 hectares	 of	 the	 1600	 hectares	were	
assigned	 to	nucleus	estates,	 and	only	353	hectares	were	assigned	 to	
smallholdings	 in	Kapar.	 	Moreover,	 the	 land	 for	 the	smallholdings	has	
not	yet	been	distributed	to	Kapar	farmers.		There	are	currently	no	local	
villagers	working	on	the	353	hectares	that	should	have	been	assigned	for	
plasma	smallholdings.	Nominally	a	KUD	(Village	Unit	Cooperative)	was	
organized	to	manage	the	estates,	however,	only	 immigrants	 from	Nias	
Island	are	now	working	under	the	company’s	control.		No	Kapar	villagers	
are	working	on	PHP	plantations.36	
	 Even	worse,	 benefits	 from	 the	 estate	 are	 distributed	 to	 local	
residents	 depending	 on	 how	 close	 they	 are	 to	 the	 company.	 	On	
December	 12,	 2005,	 backed	 by	 the	 intermediation	 of	 the	 regional	
government,	a	meeting	was	held	 to	discuss	various	problems	between	
the	customary	 law	 leaders	and	 the	representatives	of	 the	company.37	
At	 the	meeting,	both	 sides	 reached	an	agreement	 that	 the	company	
would	pay	Rp	175,000	(US $	20)	to	each	household	each	month,	with	the	
distribution	of	benefits	to	continue	for	40	months	from	October	2005,	and	
that	the	money	would	be	deposited	in	the	Simpang	Empat	branch	of	the	
Nagari	Bank.38		Nevertheless,	it	is	said	that	some	villagers	are	paid	only	
Rp	20,000	per	month,	while	others	are	paid	Rp	60,000.		A	few	people	are	
reportedly	paid	up	to	one	million	rupiah.	The	members	of	Tunas Mekar,	
the	most	 critical	 farmers’	 association,	 rejected	 receiving	 the	money,	
because	 they	 felt	 that	 receiving	 the	money	would	 suggest	 that	 they	
condone	the	entire	process.	
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	 The	residents	of	Sasak	also	complain	that	the	company	has	not	kept	
its	promises.	 	According	 to	 the	agreement	between	 the	company	and	
the	village	unit	cooperative	of	Rantau Pasaman Sasak,	PHP	would	clear	
the	communal	 land	for	cultivation	in	two	areas	of plasma	smallholdings:	
Area	 I,	which	measures	 714	hectares,	 and	Area	 II,	which	 totals	 816	
hectares.	Nevertheless,	 the	village	unit	cooperative	has	harvested	only	
364	hectares	of	Area	I	as	of	December	2006;	there	is	still	no	harvest	from	
109	hectares,	 and	nothing	has	been	planted	yet	 in	 the	remaining	241	
hectares.39
3 Power Relations among Farmers’ Associations in Kapar 
3-1 Split among Farmers’ Associations in Kapar 
To	understand	what	happened	 in	Kapar	 in	 the	process	 of	 oil	 palm	
plantation	development,	an	understanding	of	the	history	of	the	farmers’	
associations	(Kelompok Tani)	is	essential.		In	1989,	when	the	development	
plan	for	oil	palm	plantations	was	first	discussed	in	Kapar,	there	was	only	
one	farmers’	association,	or	Kelompok	Tani	RTTSK	(Rintisan Tani Sakato 
Kapar).	However,	owing	to	the	conflict	over	the	transaction	process	 for	
the	communal	 land,	 the	 farmers’	association	RTTSK	split	 into	several	
organizations	in	1991.		The	communal	land	that	was	not	included	in	the	
PHP	plantation	was	divided	by	RTTSK	into	several	segments	depending	
on	the	numbers	of	members	in	each	farmers’	association.		There	are	now	
six	farmers’	associations	in	Kapar,	and	I	have	classified	them	into	three	
categories:	the	dominant,	moderate	and	minority	groups.		
	 The	dominant	group	 is	 the	 farmers’	associations	of	Sidodali, Tua 
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Sakoto	and	Pemuda Sepakat.		Sidodali	consists	of	198	households	led	by	
Mr.	BJL	and	has	400	hectares	as	their	own	plasma	smallholdings.		As	I	
have	mentioned	earlier,	Mr.	BJL	has	been	the	main	actor	 “selling”	 the	
communal	land	of	Kapar.		Owing	to	his	close	relations	with	local	banks,	
Sidodali	received	 loans	 from	the	Nagari	Bank	of	up	to	Rp	2,600,000,000	
(US $	1,300,000)	 to	develop	 its	plasma	smallholdings.	 	Among	 the	198	
households,	 only	25	households	are	Kapar	 residents	who	are	directly	
under	Mr.	BJL’s	authority,	while	the	other	households	are	 from	outside	
Kapar.		For	example,	there	are	48	households	whose	members	are	in	the	
police.40	Among	them	are	a	few	people	who	have	been	given	two	kaplings	
(four	hectares)	of	land.41	The	group	also	includes	some	members	of	PGGI	
(Persatuan Guru Indonesia,	Teachers’	Union	of	 Indonesia).	Tua Sakoto	
is	composed	of	members	of	a	single	matrilineal	 lineage	and	claims	400	
hectares	for	their	plasma.		As	Tua Sakoto	has	familial	relations	with	the	
head	of	the	village	unit	cooperative	of	a	nearby	village,	Nagari Lingkung 
Aur,	and	the	group	has	also	received	a	big	 loan	from	the	Nagari	Bank,	
Tua Sakoto	members	are	 inclined	to	go	along	with	Sidodali.	 	The	third	
group,	Pemuda Sepakat,	gets	some	credit	from	KKPA,42		in	the	form	of	a	
loan	from	the	department	of	plantation	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	
	 The	 two	 farmers’	 associations,	 RTTSK	 (Rintisan Tani Sakato 
Kapar)	 and	Ladang Basamou,	 can	be	classified	as	moderate	groups.43	
RTTSK	has	350	hectares	 for	 its	plasma,	and	both	 farmers’	associations	
claim	traditional	usage	of	communal	 land;	however,	 they	are	not	brave	
enough	to	oppose	the	dominant	group	and	have	not	directly	supported	
the	resistance	of	Tunas Mekar.	
	 The	 last	 farmers’	 group,	Tunas Mekar,	which	means	 “sprout,”	
was	 founded	 in	1998.	 	 It	 is	composed	of	145	households	who	work	180	
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hectares	of	communal	land.	The	members	had	originally	worked	an	area	
of	plasma	smallholdings	 totaling	800	hectares	which	PHP	promised	 to	
assign	to	the	smallholders	of	Kapar	 in	1997.	 	While	they	were	working	
in	the	fields,	 they	often	 faced	violence	 from	the	 local	police	and	mobile	
brigades	and	 their	crops	were	occasionally	poisoned.	Today	 they	are	
prohibited	from	even	going	to	the	fields	by	the	PHP	security	department	
forces.	 	 In	addition,	180	hectares	of	Tunas Mekar’s	holdings	were	“sold	
out”	 in	2008	by	 the	 leading	 figures	of	KAN.44	However	 they	have	not	
yet	received	any	 letters	or	documents	about	 the	sale.45	 	Here	again,	 it	
is	not	clear	what	the	word	“sold	out”	really	means.	 	 If	 this	means	that	
several	 individuals	have	already	paid	compensation	 (siriah-jariah)	 for	
the	180	hectares	to	some	customary	law	leaders,	the	rights	of	the	Tunas 
Mekar	 are	 critically	 threatened.	Recently	 they	have	been	prohibited	
from	cultivating	their	 land,	so	 they	 face	hardships	 in	maintaining	their	
livelihoods.	
		
3-2 Violence against the Tunas Mekar Members 
The	more	the	members	of	Tunas Mekar	have	openly	criticized	PHP	and	
the	leading	figures	of	customary	law,	the	more	they	have	been	exposed	
to	violence	from	the	police,	mobile	brigades	and	preman	(hoodlum)	gangs.	
	 On	April	 28,	 2000,	Tunas Mekar	 organized	 a	 rally	 at	 the	main	
crossing	 in	Simpang	Empat,	where	the	regional	government	offices	are	
located,	to	protest	against	what	they	called	“a	conspiracy	to	sell	out”	the	
communal	 land,	and	seven	members46	were	arrested	without	due	 legal	
process.	 	On	the	 following	day	hundreds	of	people	organized	a	rally	to	
protest	the	seven	arrests,	and	they	marched	to	the	jail	of	the	POLSEK	
(regional	police	at	 the	district	 level).	The	crowd	of	hundreds	destroyed	
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the	windows	and	the	lock	to	the	jail	door,	despite	being	shot	with	rubber	
bullets	by	police,	and	the	seven	detainees	escaped.47		On	April	30,	several	
trucks	full	of	BRIMOB	and	regional	policemen	arrived	in	Kapar	to	sweep	
the	area.		As	described	in	the	Chronology of the Communal Land Issue of 
Nagari Kapar, Pasaman District	 (not	dated,	see	note	16)	they	“declared”	
war	on	the	people	and	fired	bullets	in	the	air.		Upon	learning	of	the	police	
action,	 the	villagers	became	very	 frightened	and	most	of	 the	men	ran	
away.		Only	three	men	remained	in	the	village;	they	were	soon	arrested	
and	badly	beaten	while	being	taken	to	jail.		In	response,	on	May	17,	2000,	
several	women	from	Kapar	organized	a	demonstration	before	the	DPRD	
Pasaman	 (assembly	 of	 Pasaman	District)	 and	 requested	 a	 peaceful	
resolution.		Then	on	April	19,	2001,	500	people	demonstrated	in	front	of	
the	Provincial	Assembly	of	West	Sumatra	 in	Padang	with	the	support	
of	the	Association	of	Peasants	and	Fishermen	(P2TANTRA).		After	that,	
those	 residents	who	had	been	detained	 in	 jail	were	 freed,	 contingent	
upon	paying	a	fine	of	Rp	500,000	(US $	50)	per	person.48	
	 Later,	however,	police	counter-attacked.	 In	 the	early	morning	of	
August	10,	2001,	two	leaders	of	Tunas Mekar	were	arrested	on	charges	
of	being	provocateurs.	According	to	a	letter	written	by	the	daughter	of	
Mr.	YL,	the	leader	of	Tunas Mekar,	the	police	arrested	Mr.	YL	without	
a	warrant,	and	he	was	hospitalized	under	a	different	name	to	conceal	
the	fact	that	he	had	been	beaten	badly	while	being	taken	away	by	the	
police.49	Curiously,	 the	warrant	was	 issued	after	his	arrest	on	suspicion	
of	provoking	the	destruction	of	 the	 jail	 in	Simpang	Empat	on	April	30,	
2000.50	Even	after	 the	arrests	of	 the	Tunas Mekar	members,	 the	police	
and	 the	dominant	 farmers’	association	have	behaved	brutally	 towards	
them,	and	some	members	of	Tunas Mekar	were	arrested	again	recently.51	
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Mr.	ZUL,	 a	 young	 activist	 in	Tunas Mekar,	 has	 been	 already	been	
arrested	twice.	 	He	was	first	arrested	during	the	first	police	sweep	on	
April	30,	2000,	and	was	jailed	for	a	month.		He	was	arrested	again	in	May	
2007	and	jailed	for	six	months.		
	 Indonesia	 is	often	criticized	 for	 its	abuse	of	prisoners.52	Mr.	ZUL’
s	 remarks	on	his	 experience	 in	prison	 suggest	 that	 such	criticism	 is	
warranted.	 Indonesian	prisoners	are	commonly	 subjected	 to	violence	
and	deprived	 of	 human	dignity.	While	 in	 jail,	Mr.	ZUL	was	beaten	
every	day,	and	 the	police	 tried	 to	 force	him	to	admit	 to	participating	
in	the	destructive	activities	at	 the	regional	police	site.	 	He	was	subject	
repeatedly	 to	electric	 shocks	on	his	back.	 	Finally	he	was	 freed:	 the	
justification	given	was	that	there	had	been	a	request	from	his	family.53		
	 Certainly,	some	of	the	other	villagers	do	not	support	the	dominant	
farmers’	associations;	however,	 they	remain	silent	out	of	 fear	of	violent	
retribution.	Furthermore,	due	 to	cronyism	even	within	Tunas Mekar,	
some	of	 the	younger	members	have	dropped	out	and	 joined	preman	
gangs	 for	Sidodali,	 or	one	of	 the	dominant	 farmers’	 associations.	The	
Institute	 of	 Legal	Aid	 in	Padang	 (LBH	Padang)	 had	been	 advising	
Tunas Mekar	on	the	arrests	of	 its	members	and	the	violence	that	they	
faced;	however,	 it	decided	not	to	support	the	minority	members’	claims	
regarding	the	sale	of	180	hectares,	due	to	its	reluctance	to	get	involved	
in	what	has	become	a	horizontal	conflict	among	the	villagers.
3-3 Objections of the Dominant Group 
It	must	also	be	noted	that	 the	village	adat	council	of	Kapar	expressed	
objections	against	the	charge	that	some	members	of	KAN	had	sold	the	
communal	land	without	following	the	proper	procedures.		They	wrote	at	
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least	two	letters	rebutting	this	criticism.		On	August	19,	2000,	Mr.	BJL	as	
the	chairman	of	KAN,	and	Mr.	RM	as	the	vice	chairman,	wrote	a	letter54	
to	 the	director	 of	KOMNASHAM,	a	human	rights	non-governmental	
organization.55	In	this	formal	letter,	they	cited	four	points	found	in	a	letter	
from	KOMNASHAM.56	Mr.	BJL	and	Mr.	RM	criticized	the	 four	points,	
claiming	that	those	points	were	based	on	a	personal	letter	dated	on	July	
13,	and	that	 there	was	no	evidence	to	support	 them.	Then	they	asked	
KOMNASHAM	to	acknowledge	 the	 following	assertions:	 “(1)	Because	
the	letter	from	KOMNASHAM	was	not	based	on	hearings	in	our	village,	
writing	such	a	 letter	with	no	proof	 is	a	violation	of	the	existing	law.	 (2)	
As	 the	chairman	of	KAN,	 former	village	mayor	and	ninik-mamak,	we	
cannot	 accept	 the	 criticism	 that	we	 sold	3500	hectares	of	 communal	
land	without	 following	 legal	procedures.	 (3)	As	 the	 transaction	of	 the	
communal	 land	was	based	on	customary	 law,	 Islam	and	 the	existing	
law,	no	mistakes	were	committed.		On	the	contrary,	the	faction	that	has	
criticized	us	represents	only	a	small	group,	and	they	even	destroyed	the	
jail.”	
	 In	addition	to	this	letter,	Mr.	BJL	and	Mr.	RM	wrote	another	letter	
to	LBH	Padang	on	August	 28,	 2000.57	They	criticized	LBH	Padang’s	
comment	in	an	article	in	Tempo,	a	weekly	magazine	in	Indonesia,	dated	
August	2,	2000.		LBH	Padang,	they	stated,	mistakenly	identified	a	person	
who	was	said	 to	have	witnessed	20	to	30	Kapar	residents	being	taken	
to	the	regional	police	station.		In	this	letter,	they	blamed	those	villagers	
who	were	reportedly	taken	to	the	police	station,	writing	that	 they	had	
committed	crimes	including	destruction	of	the	jail	and	setting	fire	to	the	
jail.
	 Members	of	the	village	adat	council	(KAN)	of	Kapar	thus	repeated	
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and	emphasized	that	as	the	transaction	of	the	Kapar	communal	land	was	
based	on	adat,	Islam	and	the	existing	law,	these	transactions	were	legal,	
and	they	claimed	that	any	criticism	of	 the	adat	council	was	not	based	
on	facts.		The	council	also	insisted	that	it	was	justifiable	to	punish	those	
people	who	criticized	it,	because	the	critics	had	committed	crimes.	
	 In	addition	to	this	intra-village	discord,	the	dominant	group	has	also	
been	in	conflict	with	PHP.		They	also	have	complained	that	PHP	has	not	
implemented	the	 terms	of	an	agreement	made	on	March	15,	1997,58	 in	
which	the	company	promised	to	divide	their	estate	of	1600	hectares	 in	
half:	50%	to	plasma	smallholdings	and	50%	to	nucleus	estates	after	2001.	
As	I	mentioned	earlier,	the	company	has	not	yet	carried	out	this	division,	
so	the	villagers	believe	they	had	been	cheated	by	the	company.	Under	
the	names	of	the	chairman	of	the	village	unit	cooperative	of	Kapar	and	
the	vice	chairman,	the	dominant	group	has	taken	PHP	to	court	to	force	
it	to	carry	out	the	agreement’s	provisions,	and	the	high	court	of	Padang	
accepted	their	claim	on	January	8,	2007.		The	company	then	appealed	to	
the	Supreme	Court;	however,	 the	company	suddenly	asked	the	district	
court	of	Lubuk	Sikaping	to	withdraw	their	case,	and	the	court	agreed	to	
this.59
	 At	a	meeting	of	village	adat	council	members	to	discuss	what	steps	
to	take	next	after	their	“victory”	 in	February	2008,	I	asked	them	about	
the	status	of	 the	1600	hectares	 for	which	an	HGU	has	been	 issued	 to	
PHP.	After	a	long	silence,	the	pucuk-adat,	or	a	descendent	of	the	village	
founder,	answered	that	 the	1600	hectares	was	still	 tanah ulayat,	or	 the	
communal	land.	Nevertheless,	even	though	they	themselves	believe	that	
the	1600	hectares	are	still	their	communal	land,	there	is	almost	no	way	to	
cancel	the	right	of	land	exploitation.60			
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	 Following	 colonial	 law,	 the	 length	 of	 Erpacht	 (right	 of	 land	
exploitation)	was	formerly	35	years,	and	it	could	be	extended	to	75	years.	
However,	 in	2004	Law	No.	18	covering	plantations	made	 it	possible	 to	
extend	 the	 length	of	an	HGU	up	 to	95	years	 (Article	11),	 and	 in	2007	
Investment	Law	No.	25	made	 it	possible	 to	extend	an	HGU	a	 total	of	
up	to	155	years.		As	almost	nobody	knows	the	terms	in	years	for	every	
HGU,	it	is	likely	that	land	disputes	will	increase	in	number	in	the	future.61	
	 Although	 relations	 between	 the	 dominant	 farmers’	 group	
and	 Tunas Mekar	 are	 strained,	 there	 remain	 some	 channels	 for	
communication	and	thus	prospects	 for	 later	reconciliation.	 	 It	was	Mr.	
ZUL,	 an	active	member	of	Tunas Mekar,	who	 introduced	me	 to	Mr.	
BJL,	 the	 former	chairman	of	 the	village	adat	council,	because	they	are	
members	of	the	same	matrilineal	lineage.		Mr.	BJL	accepted	Mr.	ZUL	as	
his	mamak,	or	maternal	uncle.	 	Mr.	ZUL	told	me	several	times	that	his	
uncle	once	sent	him	to	jail,	but	that	they	continue	to	communicate.		Mr.	
BJL	 later	 took	Mr.	ZUL	and	me	to	the	meeting	mentioned	 just	before.	
As	all	 those	present	knew	that	Mr.	ZUL	had	been	arrested	twice	and	
was	 formerly	very	 critical	 of	 them,	 they	were	 embarrassed	by	 our	
unexpected	appearance.	 	Sensing	 that	 the	atmosphere	of	 the	meeting	
would	be	extremely	strained,	the	former	adat	chairman	first	introduced	
us	to	the	other	members.		We	left	the	meeting	before	they	started	their	
discussions,	but	we	were	 later	 informed	 that	 they	vowed	 to	continue	
fighting	 to	 force	PHP	 to	keep	 its	 promises.	However,	 the	 company	
adamantly	refuses	to	follow	the	agreement,	claiming	that	to	do	so	would	
result	in	a	plunge	in	profitability.		
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4. The Social Background of Violence  
4-1 Strengthening Ties between the Military and Business 
Earlier	in	this	article,	I	referred	to	the	shooting	of	a	suspected	FFB	thief	
in	Kinali.	A	mobile	brigade	officer	who	was	a	security	guard	at	the	PMJ	
oil	palm	plantation,	which	is	also	a	subsidiary	of	the	Wilmar	Group,	fired	
at	 the	suspect	without	warning.	Judging	 from	the	situation,	 there	was	
no	evidence	 to	prove	he	had	committed	a	crime.	This	 incident	 raises	
the	question	of	why	mobile	brigades	were	employed	by	 the	oil	palm	
company.	 	While	FFB	theft	 frequently	occurs,	 this	does	not	necessarily	
justify	 the	presence	of	mobile	brigades	 in	 the	estate.	 	 If	 the	company	
wants	to	prevent	theft,	there	is	no	need	to	hire	mobile	brigades	because	
they	are	too	heavily	armed	for	such	a	purpose.	
	 Liem	 Soei	 Liong	 analyzed	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	TNI	
(Indonesian	National	Armed	Forces)	and	business	as	follows	(Liong,	2002:	
220-22):		
The	state	budget	supplies	only	25 %	of	the	 funds	required	by	the	
military.	The	post-Suharto	changes	have	created	dents	in	the	wide	
spectrum	of	military	business.		In	the	early	years	of	the	Orde Baru	
(New	Order),	 the	 sky	was	 the	 limit	 for	TNI	officers.	 	Superrich	
generals	were	part	 of	 the	 Jakarta	 jet	 set.	 	The	practice	 of	 so-
called	 ‘Ali	Baba	companies’62	 became	common.	But	 things	grew	
worse	for	TNI	officers	when	it	was	decided	in	1988	that	’strategic’	
companies	needed	special	protection.		TNI	soldiers	became	security	
guards	 for	such	companies	and	were	put	on	their	payroll.	 	Many	
generals	became	increasingly	dependent	on	one	or	more	companies	
or	conglomerates.	While	 low-ranking	officials	 supplemented	 their	
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meager	 income	 by	moonlighting	 as	 security	 guards	 or	 shop	
detectives,	top	generals	became	the	errand	boys	of	big	business.		
	 Basically,	 I	agree	with	the	analysis	of	Liem	Soei	Liong.63	 It	 is	still	
true	 in	 the	 current	Reformasi	 (Reform)	period	 that	 the	military	and	
civil	servants	scout	eagerly	 for	opportunities	 to	make	up	 for	shortages	
of	 income.	 	As	 I	mentioned	 in	note	60,	 the	 regional	government	and	
military	had	been	running	plantations	 (one	a	rubber	plantation	and	the	
other	a	coffee	plantation),	 and	refused	 to	return	 the	 land	 titles	 to	 the	
people	who	had	been	claiming	their	rights	over	the	 land.	 	The	turning	
point	came	in	1965,	when	Sukarno’s	era	yielded	to	Suharto’s	New	Order,	
and	the	military	and	regional	governments	seized	many	plantations.	 In	
1974	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	established	a	cattle	ranch	 in	Mungo,	
Limapuluh	Kota	District,	on	a	site	that	had	been	a	horse	breeding	ranch	
during	Dutch	colonial	 times.	The	ministry	has	used	military	and	police	
forces	 to	guard	 the	 ranch,	 including	completely	destroying	 the	crops	
of	 local	 farmers	who	 tried	 to	work	 the	 communal	 land.	Later,	 along	
with	the	explosion	in	demand	for	oil	palms,	the	development	of	oil	palm	
plantations	has	provided	the	police-military	security	employees	with	big	
opportunities	to	augment	their	government	salaries.	
	 Furthermore,	 to	better	understand	about	 relations	between	 the	
military	and	business,	 it	 is	 important	 to	explore	the	economic	situation	
of	villages	after	regional	autonomy	was	enacted	by	the	Law	No.	22	of	
1999.	 	 In	West	Sumatra,	 the	nagari,	or	a	Minangkabau	village	based	on	
matrilineal	clans,	which	was	separated	 into	several	administrative	desa	
(Javanese	villages)	after	the	village	law	was	passed	in	1979,	was	recreated	
in	 2001.	 In	Kapalo	Hilalang,	Padang-Pariaman	District,	 the	 financial	
strength	of	a	village	became	paramount:	the	more	a	village	as	a	minimum	
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unit	 of	 administration	 relies	upon	donations	 from	 the	 enterprises	 in	
the	village,	 the	more	they	are	 inclined	to	tolerate	the	presence	of	such	
companies.	 	However	the	HGU	would	be	taken	from	companies	 if	 they	
became	unable	 to	pay	the	HGU	fee	 (Nakashima,	2007a).	 	This	was	also	
true	in	the	case	of	Kapar.		Kapar	was	revived	in	2002	as	the	smallest	unit	
of	administration.	As	I	mentioned	in	note	10,	donations	from	the	village	
enterprises	constituted	two-fifth	of	 the	general	 income	from	the	central	
government.	 	Without	 those	enterprises,	a	village	economy	would	 face	
severe	difficulties.	
	 In	 addition,	 it	must	be	 stressed	 that	 the	 revival	 of	 nagari,	 the	
Minangkabau	village,	 does	not	necessarily	mean	 a	 strengthening	 of	
democracy.		Franz	and	Keebet	Benda-Beckmann	analyzed	the	revival	of	
nagari	as	follows	(Benda-Beckmann,	2001:33):		
In	the	first	place,	adat	has	acquired	great	symbolic	and	rhetorical	
importance,	 which	 fuels	 political	 activity	 related	 to	 these	
administrative	and	political	changes.	The	discussions	about	going	
back	 to	 the	 nagari	 are	 presented	 and	understood	 as	 giving	 a	
greater	 role	 to	 adat	 and	 the	Village	Adat	Council,	 even	 though	
the	new	regulations	may	not	necessarily	give	more	powers	to	the	
council.	A	return	 to	 the	nagari	 structure	 is	 thus	a	 symbolic	act	
within	the	wider	national	political	debate.		At	local	levels,	the	nagari	
government	and	the	stress	on	adat	values	are	intended	to	eradicate	
or	minimize	many	 social	 evils:	 reconstructing	 the	 unity	 and	
strengthening	cooperation	within	the	nagari	community,	restoring	
respect	for	the	elderly	through	the	strengthening	of	descent-based	
groups	and	authority	and	the	prevention	of	the	selling	out	of	nagari	
resources	to	outside	“investors”.		
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	 They	are	right	to	point	out	the	 increase	 in	respect	of	adat	values	
and	 the	 authority	 of	 village	 adat	 councils	 after	 the	 nagari	 revival.	
However,	 the	 village	 leaders	 in	Mungo,64	 Guguk	 and	Kapar	 have	
been	 critical	 of	 villagers	who	have	been	 claiming	 their	 right	 to	 the	
communal	land.		The	adat	leaders	have	been	particularly	disparaging	of	
the	activities	of	Tunas Mekar,	portraying	 their	actions	as	violations	of	
national	laws.	In	many	places	where	land	disputes	between	residents	and	
commercial	operations	become	serious,	we	can	also	see	conflicts	among	
the	villagers	themselves.		
	 Franz	and	Keebet	Benda-Beckmann	have	proposed	a	solution	 to	
the	communal	 land	disputes	 in	 their	analysis	of	communal	property	of	
Minangkabau	 (Von	Benda-Beckmann,	2006:212-3).	 	They	say	as	 follows;	
“Treating	 ‘communal	 rights’	 as	 a	more	or	 less	homogenous	category	
and	theorizing	about	how	people	are	likely	to	deal	with	property	under	
a	 ‘common	property’	 regime,	without	detailing	 the	kind	of	 communal	
property	and	 the	very	different	possible	constellations	of	 concretized	
rights,	is	bound	to	fail.”		In	referring	to	the	heterogeneous	nature	of	such	
rights	and	traditions,	I	assume	that	Benda-Beckmann	would	suggest	that	
Islam	might	serve	as	a	bridge	to	help	negotiations	between	the	dominant	
group	and	the	minority	group	in	Kapar.		
	 However,	 such	a	conclusion	 lacks	an	understanding	of	 the	power	
balance	 in	 the	village	and	 its	effect	on	decision-making.	Every	village	
mayor	 (wali nagari)	 I	 saw	stressed	 that	he	 tried	 to	 remain	a	neutral	
party	 in	disputes.	 	He	 is	elected	 in	a	village	election,	and	unlike	village	
heads	 in	 the	Suharto	era,	he	 is	not	 required	 to	profess	 fealty	 to	 the	
central	government.	Every	village	has	some	representatives	 from	the	
Islamic	 leadership	as	part	of	 the	decision-making	system.	 	However,	so	
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far	as	 I	know,	virtually	none	of	 these	 Islamic	 leaders	protest	decisions	
or	criticize	 the	dominant	group.	 	 In	 the	case	of	Kapar,	 those	 leaders	
who	were	critical	of	the	local	powers	had	been	already	banned	from	the	
decision-making	system.		In	addition	to	Islam,	the	LKAAM	(Adat	Council	
of	 the	Whole	Minangkabau)	can	also	be	considered	 to	be	a	mediating	
force,	but	it	lacks	any	delegated	political	power.	Villagers	occasionally	ask	
LKAAM	to	support	their	movement,	and	LKAAM	issues	a	statement	of	
support	to	the	people,	but	no	regional	authority	regards	these	statements	
seriously.65		
4-2 Costs of Security 
At	the	beginning	of	1-1,	I	cited	Barlow	et	al.	 (2003)	on	the	security	cost	
of	oil	palm	plantations.	They	estimated	that	5 % -10 %	of	estates’	crops	
had	been	 stolen,	 and	 that	 oil	 palm	companies	 should	 expect	 to	pay	
approximately	US	5	dollars	per	 ton	of	FFB	 for	 security	 forces.	 	An	
underlying	reason	for	the	thefts	 is	the	fact	that	many	residents	believe	
they	have	 the	right	 to	steal	because	 the	companies	are	not	upholding	
the	 agreed-upon	 ratio	 of	 plasma	 smallholdings	 and	nucleus	 estates.	
Consequently	many	residents,	 including	women	and	children,	 “recover”	
their	rights	during	moonlit	nights.	 	The	companies	 thus	 feel	 forced	to	
rely	on	security	forces	to	defend	themselves	from	theft.	
	 Some	15	BRIMOB	soldiers	–	an	elite	unit	of	 the	Provincial	Police	
of	West	Sumatra	–	are	said	to	be	stationed	 in	Kapar.	 	These	BRIMOB	
soldiers	are	functionally	connected	to	the	company’s	security	department	
(sekuriti perkebunan),	which	consists	of	25-35	members.	Regular	security	
members	are	recruited	from	outside	Kapar,	such	as	from	North	Sumatra	
(the	Batak	ethnic	group)	and	Flores.	Unlike	heavily	armed	BRIMOB,	they	
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are	completely	unarmed.	They	patrol	the	plantation	grounds	and	report	
to	BRIMOB	if	they	find	a	security	breach.		
	 Payments	to	the	BRIMOB	soldiers,	reportedly	some	Rp	20,000,000-Rp	
30,000,000	 (US $	 2,300-3,300)	 a	month,	 are	made	 by	 customary	 law	
leaders,	and	the	funds	come	from	PHP,	Bank	Nagari	(the	West	Sumatra	
Development	Bank)	and	the	dominant	 farmers’	associations.	 	They	are	
presumably	paid	additional	 funds	 in	case	of	a	serious	security	 incident.	
In	addition	 to	 their	 regular	 income,	 the	BRIMOB	officers	 receive	an	
allotment	of	FFBs.		Besides	these	expenditures,	the	company,	bank	and	
farmers’	groups	must	pay	some	money	to	preman	gangs	to	threaten	the	
Tunas Mekar	members.
	 Besides	 these	 security	people,	 there	are	45	police	 officers	 from	
POLRES	(regional	police	at	the	sub-district	level)	at	PHP.	They	are	also	
charged	with	patrolling	 the	plantation,	 and	 it	 is	usually	 these	police	
officers	who	arrest	 suspicious	people.	 	These	45	POLRES	officers	are	
nominal	members	of	 the	 farmers’	 association	of	Sidodali,	 a	dominant	
farmers’	 association	 in	Kapar,	 and	 they	have	been	bestowed	with	90	
hectares	for	the	miniscule	fee	of	Rp	15	million	(US $	1,600)	per	2-hectare	
kapling.		The	market	price	of	2	hectares	is	approximately	Rp	200	million	
(US $	22,000).	Therefore	this	 is	nothing	but	a	gift	 from	the	 local	 leaders	
to	the	regional	police.		Presumably	they	would	arrange	for	someone	else	
to	work	on	their	land	and	would	receive	the	benefits	after	the	harvest	of	
FFB.		
	 The	 adat	 leaders	 of	 the	 dominant	 farmers’	 associations,	who	
received	 large	 monetary	 rewards	 from	 the	 communal	 land	 use,	
reportedly	exhausted	their	proceeds	equally	quickly,	spending	on	liquor,	
gambling	and	prostitution.66	Villagers	said	 that	nothing	was	 left	 in	 the	
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end	except	 for	a	 few	 large	Toyota	 land	cruisers.	 	Some	members	of	
Tunas Mekar	told	me	that	“the	money	which	was	gained	by	evil	means	
was	eaten	by	Satan.”67	It	can	be	said	that	the	oil	palm	industry	decimated	
both	the	environment	of	Kapar	as	well	as	 the	relationships	among	the	
people	and	their	Islamic-based	morals.		
4-3 Immigrants as Key Figures in Conflicts 
The	members	of	Tunas Mekar	with	whom	I	spoke	not	only	criticized	the	
dominant	farmers’	associations,	the	company	and	the	military-police,	but	
also	the	immigrants	from	Java,	North	Sumatra	and	Nias.		They	constantly	
criticized	the	company	for	not	 implementing	 its	promised	50-50	ratio	of	
plasma	and	nucleus	estates;	at	 the	same	time	they	complained	that	the	
company	only	employed	immigrants	as	workers	on	nucleus	estates.		This	
does	not	necessarily	mean	 that	 they	want	 to	be	employed	as	nucleus	
estate	workers	under	the	company	control,	however,	I	assume,	through	
their	discourse,	 that	 the	presence	of	 the	 immigrants	made	 the	Tunas 
Mekar	members’	position	very	difficult.	 	Their	derogatory	comments	
about	the	immigrants	seemed	to	reveal	their	feelings	of	irritation.		From	
the	company’s	perspective	 the	 immigrant	workers	must	be	desirable	
employees:	mainly	 landless	peasants,	without	roots	 in	Kapar,	who	are	
eagerly	 scouting	 for	work.	 	They	are	 expected	 to	willingly	 take	 on	
any	tasks	 for	the	company.	 	That	 is	 the	reason	why	some	of	 them	are	
employed	in	the	company’s	security	department.	
	 West	Sumatra	has	a	long	history	of	immigration.	In	the	Dutch	era	
many	Javanese	immigrants	were	imported	to	Kapar	as	rubber	plantation	
workers.	 	Many	of	 those	 rubber	plantations	have	now	become	state	
oil	 palm	plantations	 (the	 state-owned	Perkebunan Nusantara	Group).	
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Concurrent	with	 the	economic	development	of	 the	New	Order,	many	
immigrants	came	 to	Kapar	 from	Nias,	North	Sumatra,	and	even	 from	
Flores.	Audrey	Kahin	 (1999:	234-250)	described	the	 influence	of	the	PKI	
(Indonesian	Communist	Party)	as	follows:		
Most	of	the	Diponegoro	officers	who	served	in	West	Sumatra	after	
1958	were	 left-leaning.	The	Communist	Party	did	not	 succeed	 in	
capitalizing	 on	 its	 entrenchments	within	 the	 local	military	 and	
administrative	 order,	 in	 large	 part	 because	 it	 had	 become	 so	
firmly	 identified	with	 the	 Javanese	 and	 their	 occupation	 forces.	
In	Payakumbuh,	Pesisir	Selatan	and	parts	 of	Agam,	Communist	
support	derived	 from	 indigenous	 traditions	stretching	back	to	 the	
1920s,	but	 in	Sawahlunto	and	parts	of	Pasaman	 its	major	strength	
lay	among	the	PKI	oriented	Javanese	immigrant	population.	
	 From	 the	 security	 perspective,	 the	 immigrants	 represent	 one	
group	of	actors	in	the	local	community.		Article	20	of	Law	No.	18	(2004)	
on	plantations	prescribes:	 “The	plantation	business	actors	shall	perform	
plantation	business	safely	 in	coordination	with	security	personnel,	and	
they	can	ask	assistance	 from	the	surrounding	community.”	From	my	
experience	 in	 the	 field,	 I	am	certain	 that	 the	surrounding	community	
who	would	be	expected	 to	assist	 the	 security	personnel	 includes	 the	
immigrants	as	well	as	the	dominant	farmers’	group.		
	 To	understand	how	the	immigrants	can	be	key	figures	in	conflicts,	
it	 is	 instructive	to	examine	a	case	of	communal	land	struggle	in	Kapalo	
Hialang,	Padang-Pariaman	District.	As	I	previously	explained	in	note	60,	
the	military	command	of	West	Sumatra	once	recognized	 the	demands	
of	 local	 residents,	 and	 they	suggested	 that	 the	people	share	proceeds	
from	the	rubber	crops.		However	due	to	the	objections	of	residents	of	a	
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sub-village	of	Tarok,	where	Javanese	immigrants	and	their	descendants	
occupied	one-third	of	the	population	of	3,000,	the	military	withdrew	their	
proposal.	The	Tarok	villagers	had	not	participated	in	the	land	struggles,	
and	they	would	not	agree	that	the	land	belonged	to	the	village	of	Kapalo	
Hilalang.	 	 In	 response,	 they	wanted	 to	 create	 a	new	nagari	 (village)	
of	 their	 own,	but	 their	desire	was	denied	by	 the	 regent.	The	Tarok	
villagers	were	critical	of	plans	to	monopolize	the	communal	land	because	
they	lived	near	the	communal	land,	and	they	worried	that	they	would	be	
disadvantaged	if	the	struggle	for	 land	rights	was	successful.	 	It	 is	clear	
that	the	presence	of	Javanese	immigrants,	who	came	to	Kapalo	Hilalang	
after	the	PRRI68	rebellion	in	1958,	was	a	key	element	in	the	conflict.69	
		 As	noted	previously,	Article	20	of	Law	No.	18	on	plantations	(2004)	
mentions	 the	expectation	 that	 the	surrounding	community	will	 assist	
the	security	people,	and	this	can	also	refer	to	the	preman	gangs.		In	fact,	
preman	gangs	have	been	working	as	agents	of	Sidodali,	 the	dominant	
farmers’	 association.	 	This	 law	may	 legalize	 the	presence	of	 preman	
gangs	in	the	name	of	plantation	security.		These	gangs	have	a	powerful	
presence	in	many	areas.		In	Sukabumi,	West	Java,	for	example,	which	is	
a	center	 for	 the	mineral	water	business	 in	 Indonesia,	 the	preman	have	
formed	a	 recruiting	agency,	 and	 they	closely	monitor	 local	 residents’	
activities.70	In	many	places	of	conflict	violence	from	those	preman	gangs	
has	targeted	those	people	who	have	been	fighting	for	their	rights.
5. Concluding Remarks 
In	 the	 Introduction	 to	Roots of Violence in Indonesia,	 the	 editors	
Narihisa	NAKASHIMA
Hosei University Repository
161
(Colombijn	and	Lindblad,	2002:	23)	emphasized	the	historical	memory	of	
violence	during	Dutch	colonial	times.		Among	their	seven	points,	several	
points	clearly	relate	to	my	analysis	of	the	Kapar	case.		They	write,“when	
the	outsider	is	dehumanized,	violence	takes	an	exceptionally	brutal	form.”	
In	the	cases	of	Kapar	and	Mungo	the	“outsiders”	who	are	dehumanized	
are	the	minority	farmers’	groups	in	the	villages.		I	have	pointed	out	that	
the	minority	groups	in	Kapar	and	Mungo	are	seen	as	outsiders	who	are	
dehumanized,	but	this	kind	of	logic	is	quite	similar	to	the	anthropological	
theory	of	witchcraft.	 	To	apply	such	a	 theory	 to	a	case	study	of	 land	
disputes,	we	have	 to	examine	 the	power	relations	as	well	as	how	and	
why	groups	are	dehumanized.		
	 They	also	write:	“in	the	Indonesian	context,	the	young	men	present	
themselves	 in	the	pemuda	 (the	youth)	 idiom,	which	can	be	turned	back	
to	the	Indonesian	Revolution,	and	which	generates	violence	with	an	aura	
of	heroism.	 	Violence	 is	often	conducted	by	gangs	of	 strongmen,	who	
are	employed	by	politicians	and	administrators	alike.	 	The	deployment	
of	such	gangs	increases	the	overall	tendency	to	violence.		Since	colonial	
times,	the	state	has	used	violence	against	its	own	citizens	in	cases	where	
other	government	would	 abstain	 from	 the	use	 of	 force.”	 	 It	 is	quite	
certain	 that	preman	gangs	are	employed	by	strongmen,	but	 I	 cannot	
accept	that	preman	gangs	should	be	viewed	as	having	an	aura	of	heroism	
as	 the	editors	of	Roots of Violence in Indonesia	did.	Thus	 it	 is	overly	
simplistic	to	emphasize	that	the	violence	of	Reformasi	era	has	its	roots	in	
colonial	times.	We	must	also	understand	how	the	oil	palm	companies	rely	
on	security	personnel	to	ensure	their	profitability.	
	 In	 terms	 of	 continuity	 between	 the	 Reformasi	 era	 and	 the	
colonial	era,	one	area	of	agreement	would	be	with	the	use	of	 the	word	
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“provocateur.”	 	The	 term	 “provocateur”	 is	 still	 used	 descriptively	
when	people	are	arrested	and	tortured	 for	criticizing	the	dark	side	of	
development	 in	Kapar	and	Mungo.	 “Provocateurs”	was	also	 the	 label	
used	to	 identify	nationalist	 leaders	by	the	colonial	government.	 	 In	the	
New	Order	Indonesia,	the	term	referred	to	alleged	communists	who	had	
supposedly	usurped	government	power.71	It	is	very	unfortunate	that	the	
Indonesian	police	and	military	are	still	 looking	 for	such	“provocateurs,”	
even	 in	 the	Reform	era.	 	Liem	Soei	Liong	 is	quite	 right	 (Liong,	 2002:	
204)	when	 he	writes	 that	 “Despite	 its	 achievement,	 the	Reformasi 
movement	did	not	 target	 the	 [intelligence]	agencies,	 and	 they	remain	
largely	untouched	by	 reform.”	 In	 conclusion,	 the	more	 support	 the	
Indonesia	government	 lends	to	the	development	policy	of	expanding	oil	
palm	plantations,	 the	more	 local	 leaders	and	the	companies	will	rely	on	
security	personnel	and	their	methods	to	counter	the	resistance	of	 local	
residents.				
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Table 1.  Oil Palm Production in West Sumatra 
Table 2.  Oil Palm Product in West Pasaman
Total production (2004)   252,038 tons 
Developed plantation land    93,602 ha 
Source of Table 1, 2: http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/commodityarea.php?ia=1311&ic=2
Total production (2004)   686,355 tons 
Developed plantation land   280,000 ha 
Projected plantation land      14,500 ha 
Land designation Communal Land (Tanah Ulayat) 
Oil	Palm	Development	and	Violence
Hosei University Repository
164
Table3. Estimates of Indonesian Consumption
 and  Production of CPO 2000-2005 (in tons) 
No Year Consumption Production 
1 2000 3,575,600 3,733,000 
2 2001 3,944,400 4,161,600 
3 2002 4,355,000 4,633,900 
4 2003 4,844,700 5,164,200 
5 2004 5,461,100 5,759,900 
6 2005 *) 6,043,300 *) 6,429,200 
Table4.  Area of Oil Palm Plantations in Indonesia 
No Year Area (in hectares) % Increase  
1 2000 3,180,614 ha - 
2 2001 3,431,000 ha 7.87% 
3 2002 3,718,541 ha 8.38% 
4 2003 4,045,012 ha 8.77% 
5 2004 *  4,409,306 ha 9% 
* Projection Source of Table 
 3,4: http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/trade/profiles.php?fid=8&db=ind&mode=list&cat=11&pid=6 
(Office of Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Indonesia, Ottawa, Canada) 
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Note
1	 See	http://econ.mpob.gov.my/economy/annual/stat2007/Production3.2.htm	and	
http://www.flex-news-food.com/pages/18398/Indonesia/Palm-Oil/indonesia-09-
palm-oil-output-194-million-tonnes.htm.
2	 http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2007/12/Indonesia_palmoil/.		
3	 Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Pengurus Bidang Keuangan, Tahun 2005/2006,	
Koperasi	Uni	Desa	Rantau	Pasaman	Sasak.	 	A Koperasi Unit Desa	 (KUD)	 is	a	
village	unit	cooperative	with	multiple	purposes,	and	it	is	controlled	by	the	Ministry	
of	Cooperation.	When	started	 in	the	 late	1960s,	KUDs	were	expected	to	support	
national	rice	expansion	planning.		It	is	possible	to	organize	a	new	KUD	if	there	are	
a	minimum	of	20	members.
4	 The	 two	activists	 are	Mr.	Norman	 Jiwan	of	Sawit	Watch	and	Mr.	Andiko	of	
HUMA	(Association	for	Legal	Reform	based	on	Local	Communities	and	Ecology).	
5	 The	report	of	this	workshop	was	published	in	News Letter,	No	63,	JANNI	(Japan	
Indonesia	NGO	Network),	2008,	pp.	3-22.		The	activists’	views	are	also	included	in	
Promised	Land	(2006).
6	 The	 larger	plantation	 companies	usually	 operate	 their	 own	CPO	mills,	while	
smaller	 plantation	 companies	 sell	 their	 FFB	 to	 CPO	mills	 of	 neighboring	
plantations.	Gelder	(2004)	lists	major	oil	palm	plantation	groups	in	Indonesia.		
7	 I	am	grateful	to	members	of	PBHI	(Association	for	Legal	Aid	and	Human	Rights	
in	Indonesia)	West	Sumatra	for	sharing	this	information	with	me.
8	 West	Pasaman	District	became	a	separate	entity	from	Pasaman	District	in	2003.		
9	 The	Mobile	Brigade	is	one	of	the	oldest	National	Police	units,	formed	in	late	1945.	
The	mobile	brigade	was	used	primarily	as	an	elite	corps	for	emergencies,	aiding	in	
		 police	operations	that	required	units	to	take	quick	action.	The	unit	was	employed	
in	domestic	security	and	defense	operations	and	was	 issued	special	 riot-control	
equipment.	See	http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/polri.htm.	
10	 The	amount	of	general	 income	of	 the	district,	or	PAD	(Pendapatan Asli Daerah)	
was	Rp	61,800,000,000	(approximately	US $	7,000,000	at	the	then-current	exchange	
rate).	The	exchange	rate	of	rupiah	 to	US	dollars	has	been	stable	at	around	Rp	
8,000-9,000	since	 the	1998	 financial	crisis,	 although	 the	rupiah’s	value	spiked	 to	
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Rp15,000	a	 few	 times	during	1998.	The	exchange	rate	of	 rupiah	 to	US	dollars	
before	the	economic	crisis	 in	1997	had	been	between	Rp	1,800	and	Rp	2,300	per	
dollar.		See	the	website	of	Tohoukankoukyoku.		
11	 The	 coastal	 area	 of	 West	 Pasaman	 is	 covered	 with	 peat	 swamps,	 so	 the	
development	of	oil	palm	 in	such	areas	has	raised	environmental	 issues,	 too.	The	
villagers	along	 the	 Indian	Ocean	have	complained	 that	 they	often	experience	
flooding.	Before	 the	plantation	existed	 flooding	 typically	occurred	only	once	a	
year,	but	since	the	plantation	was	established	they	have	been	subject	to	flooding	
more	than	five	times	a	year,	with	flood	waters	often	rising	to	1.5	meters.	 (Walhi	
SUMBAR,	2009)
12	 Minangkabau	have	 two	kinds	of	property	designations.	One	 is	harta pusako,	or	
inherited	property	 through	matrilineal	 lineages,	 comprising	both	material	 and	
immaterial	goods.	The	other	 form	 is	ulayat,	or	village	commons,	 the	part	of	 the	
village	territory	that	was	not	used	 for	sedentary	agriculture	and	that	 fell	under	
the	control	of	the	village	councils	or	the	heads	of	the	village’s	matrilineal	clans.	
13	 See	http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/commodity.php?ic=2.	
14	 “Tanah Ulayat Permudah Pembangunan Infrastruktur,”	http://www.kapanlagi.
com/h/0000232331.html.		
15	 See	village	administration	statistics	below	 (Profil Nagari Sasak Tahun 2007,	and	
Profil Nagari Kapa Kecamatan Pasaman Tahun 2002).	 	The	village	mayor	of	
Kapar	told	me	in	February	2006	that	Kapar	had	two	sources	of	income:	one	is	the	
subsidies	distributed	by	 the	government	according	 to	 the	 local	population	and	
area,	which	amounted	to	Rp	77,400,000	 (approximately	US $	8,600)	 in	2006,	and	
the	other	 is	special	 income	from	administrative	fees	and	“donations”	from	village	
enterprises,	which	amounted	to	Rp	29,000,000	(US $	3,000).		
16	 Kronologis Kasus Tanah Ulayat Nagari Kapar (Kapa) Kec. Pasaman Kab. 
Pasaman,	LBH	Padang,	not	dated.	A	pucuk-adat	 is	a	descendent	of	 the	 family	of	
the	village	founder.	
17	 This	information	is	indicated	in	the	document	listed	in	note	16.	
18	 Surat Pernyataan Tentang Pengunaan Tanah Ulayat Kapar,	August	13,	1990.	The	
content	of	the	letter	is	as	follows:	“the	communal	land	will	be	divided	into	plasma,	
or	smallholdings	 (60 % ),	and	nucleus	estates	 (40 % ).	 	Siriah Jariah	 (compensation	
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for	communal	land	exploitation)	should	be	Rp	50,000	(US $	40)	per	hectare	for	both	
smallholdings	and	nucleus	estates.	 	KAN	guarantees	 that	 the	company	will	be	
issued	the	right	of	 land	exploitation	on	the	communal	 land.”	 	As	 is	shown	 later,	
these	requirements	for	the	oil	palm	plantation	development	were	later	neglected.	
19	 With	 regards	 to	 the	process,	 see	Colchester,	 et	 al.	 (2006:	 136-51).	 	 PHP	 is	 a	
subsidiary	company	of	the	Wilmar	Group,	the	leading	agribusiness	group	in	Asia.	
It	 is	the	largest	trader	of	palm	and	lauric	oils	 in	the	world,	the	largest	edible	oil	
refiner	in	the	world,	one	of	the	largest	palm	biodiesel	manufacturers,	a	significant	
plantation	company	 in	Indonesia	and	Malaysia	 (with	a	total	 land	bank	of	573,405	
hectares),	and	the	largest	trader	and	processor	of	edible	oils	and	oilseeds	and	other	
agricultural	products	in	China	(van	Gelder,	2007).	
20	 Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Pada tgl 8 Januari 2007/No. 119/Pdt/2006/PT.PDG 
dalam perkara Perdata No. 15/PDT.G/2005/PN-LES,	January	31,	2008.	Plasma	
smallholdings	are	 types	of	 oil	palm	plantations,	 typically	 two	hectares	 in	 size,	
distributed	to	 individual	smallholders,	while	a	PIR	 (nucleus	estate)	 is	an	oil	palm	
plantation	employing	landless	workers.	The	paired	words	PIR	and	Plasma	derive	
from	the	structure	of	a	cell.	
21	 See	note	16.
22	 The	transaction	process	was	reported	as	 follows:	 (1)	Before	1990,	Mr.	BJL	 (note:	
initials	will	be	used	instead	of	the	names	of	the	individuals	identified	in	this	case	
study),	 the	 former	chairman	of	 the	village	council,	 and	his	close	Ninik-mamak	
friends	 “sold”	 60	hectares	 to	a	developer	 in	Padang.	 (2)	 In	1991,	 240	hectares	
were	 transferred	 to	Kelompok Tani RTTSK,	a	moderate	 farmers’	 association	
in	Kapar,	 however,	Mr.	BJL	 tried	unsuccessfully	 to	 “sell”	 it	 to	 a	 third	party	
later	on.	 	According	 to	 the	 latest	 information,	 the	240	hectares	became	plasma	
smallholdings	 for	RTTSK	members.	 (3)	 In	1994,	Mr.	BJL	 “sold”	70	hectares	 to	
Janus,	an	immigrant	from	Java,	and	this	70	hectares	was	used	for	homes	and	fields	
for	the	Javanese	immigrants.	(4)	In	1995,	Mr.	BJL	“sold”	2,200	hectares	to	PHP.	(5)	
In	1995,	Mr.	BJL	“sold”	10	hectares	to	H.	Sarmal,	who	was	an	entrepreneur	from	
Pariaman	city,	and	the	10	hectares	became	his	personal	plantation.	 (6)	Kelompok 
Tani Sidodali,	a	farmers’	association	of	the	dominant	group,	which	was	organized	
by	Mr.	BJL	in	1966,	“sold”	400	hectares	to	Dawar,	a	businessman	from	Nagari	Air	
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Gadang,	a	neighboring	village	of	Kapar.	 (7)	 In	1997,	12	hectares	were	 “sold”	by	
Mr.	BJL.	(8)	The	remaining	200	hectares	of	communal	land	were	transferred	to	a	
person	in	the	village,	and	then	Mr.	BJL	“sold”	them.	
23	 The	meaning	of	 “sold”	 is	ambiguous	 in	 this	document.	The	persons	who	were	
criticized	 for	 “selling”	 the	communal	 land	denied	 that	 they	had	violated	 legal	
procedures.	See	3-3,	objections	of	the	dominant	group.
24	 Each	of	them	was	said	to	have	received	Rp	64,000,000	(Rp	40,000	/	hectare	x	1600	
hectares).	In	total	they	received	approximately	Rp	700,000,000	(US $	300,000).	
25	 BPN	(National	Land	Bureau)	 issued	a	 location	permit	to	PHP	in	1995,	and	issued	
another	decree	for	PHP	to	develop	the	plasma	smallholdings	and	nucleus	estates	
in	Sasak	(Colchester,	et	al.,	2006:140).		
26	 Sasak	residents	complained	that	Kapar	had	taken	over	some	of	the	communal	land	
of	Sasak.		Nevertheless,	they	said	that	the	National	Land	Bureau	had	permitted	it.		
27	 See	note	3.
28	 See	Losing Ground,	2008,	p.	43.				
29	 GMP	(Gersindo	Minang	Plantation,	Ltd.),	another	subsidiary	of	the	Wilmar	group	
in	West	Pasaman,	promised	that	a	6,000-hectare	plantation	would	be	divided	up	
40%	for	plasma	smallholdings	and	60%	for	nucleus	estates.	In	fact,	however,	GMP	
assigned	only	1,000	hectares	 for	smallholdings,	and	the	remaining	5,000	hectares	
were	used	 for	nucleus	estates.	 	Although	the	regent	of	West	Pasaman	District	
asked	GMP	 to	keep	 its	promises	 after	hearing	 from	 incensed	 local	 residents,	
the	company	refused	to	honor	 its	commitment.	See	Singgalang,	August	10,	2006,	
February	21,	2007.	Ministry	of	Agriculture	Regulation	No.	26	(2007)	prescribes	that	
a	plantation	company	should	distribute	a	minimum	of	20 %	of	 its	 land	to	plasma	
smallholders	and	no	more	than	80 %	to	nucleus	estates.	 	This	regulation	does	
not	apply	 to	pledges	made	by	plantation	companies	before	 it	was	enacted,	but	
it	amounts	 to	a	de	 facto	official	admission	by	the	government	of	plasma	omong 
kosong	,	or	plasma	based	on	empty	promises.		This	regulation	will	no	doubt	cause	
more	land	disputes.
30	 See	note	60.	
31	 Nobody	would	 sell	 1600	hectares	outright	at	 the	 ridiculously	 low	price	of	Rp	
700,000,000	 (US $	300,000).	 	 In	terms	of	pawning	of	communal	 land	see	Biezeveld	
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(2002).		
32	 See	note	14.
33	 As	I	will	discuss	in	3-1	when	describing	the	divisive	history	of	farmers’	associations	
in	Kapar,	a	major	clash	occurred	in	1991	among	Kapar	residents,	including	ninik-
mamak.	
34	 For	more	on	differences	between	the	two	types	of	clans,	see	Navis	(1984).
35	 See	note	20.	
36	 On	 the	presence	 of	 the	 immigrants,	 see	 4-3,	 Immigrants	 as	Key	Figures	 in	
Conflicts.	
37	 Kesepakatan Bersama Antara PT Permata Hijau Pasaman Dengan Ninik-mamak 
Kapar,	not	dated.	
38	 The	Nagari	Bank,	which	 is	 formally	called	Bank Pembangunan Sumatra Barat	
(West	Sumatra	Development	Bank),	was	established	in	1962	with	5	million	rupiah,	
but	 it	has	since	become	the	second	 largest	bank	 in	West	Sumatra.	 	Nearly	half	
of	 the	savings	of	West	Sumatra	are	kept	 in	 the	Nagari	Bank,	and	middle	class	
entrepreneurs	 in	West	Sumatra	are	eager	 to	receive	 loans	 from	the	bank.	 It	 is	
said	that	the	Wilmar	Group	is	one	of	the	major	investors	in	the	Nagari	Bank.	See	
http://minangkita.com/global-news/2008/08/02/Nagari	Bank-diminta-perkuat-
pengusaha-menengah/,	 ,	 http://ekopadang.wordpress.com/2007/06/03/Nagari	
Bank-jadi-naga/,	and	http://www.Nagari	Bank.co.id/.
39	 See	note	3.		
40	 See	4-2,	Cost	of	Security.	
41	 One	kapling	is	two	hectares	in	this	case.		Originally	kapling	or	kavelling	are	Dutch	
words	meaning	a	parcel	of	land.		Usually	one	family	is	assigned	one	kapling.	
42	 KKPA	 (Kredit	Kepada	Koperasi	 Primer	Untuk	Anggotanya,	Credit	 for	 the	
Members	of	Primary	Cooperatives)	
43	 RTTSK	has	been	split	 into	many	 informal	groups,	 from	RTTSK	No.	1	to	No.	14.	
Each	time,	members	whose	opinions	differed	from	those	of	other	members	created	
informal	organizations	of	like-minded	farmers.	
44	 The	persons	and	organizations	who	“bought”	the	land,	the	members	said,	were	a	
limited	partnership,	an	anonymous	police	officer,	an	officer	of	the	local	government,	
a	Javanese	immigrant,	a	corn	trader	and	a	merchant	from	Kapar.
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45	 A	member	of	Tunas Mekar	gave	me	this	information.	
46	 According	to	a	Tunas Mekar	member,	17	people	were	arrested	on	this	day.
47	 Although	 the	 Indonesian	media	often	use	 the	word	amok	 to	describe	people’s	
behavior	during	incidents	like	this	one,	I	have	purposely	avoided	using	the	word,	
because	the	word	amok,	with	its	connotations	of	irrational	behavior,	disregards	the	
people’s	justifiable	anger.		For	example,	Kompas,	the	most	prestigious	newspaper	
in	 Indonesia,	on	July	24,	2002	described	 local	residents’	actions	 in	Batu	Sangkar	
of	Tanah	Datar	District	as	Rakyat mengamuk,	or	 “The	Peoples’	Violent	Rage.”	
Kompas	didn’t	explain	the	 incident	 in	detail,	but	 it	blamed	the	people	 for	“losing	
their	 reason.”	See Kronologis Peristiwa “Tanjung Emas Berdarah” Kabupaten 
Tanah Datar、SUMBAR,	LBH	Padang,	not	dated.
48	 They	consulted	with	LBH	Padang	 (Institute	of	Legal	Aid,	Padang)	 seeking	 to	
resolve	the	incident.	I	observed	one	trial	in	Lubuk	Sikaping,	the	capital	of	Pasaman	
District,	in	which	I	saw	many	police	officers	participating	in	the	proceedings.	They	
seemed	to	threaten	the	ordinary	people	and	even	the	judges	by	their	aggressive	
demeanor.		
49	 The	 letter	 (Kronologis Jemput Paksa Petani)	says:	 “While	 it	was	still	dark,	some	
police	officers	came	to	my	house,	and	knocked	on	the	door	to	wake	up	my	father	
forcefully.	No	one	in	the	family	wanted	to	open	the	door,	so	they	knocked	on	the	
windows	many	times.	 	My	mother	finally	opened	the	door	with	reluctance.	My	
father	asked	them	to	show	him	a	warrant;	however,	they	seized	him	and	took	him	
to	their	car.		I	asked	them	to	allow	me	to	go	with	him,	but	one	of	them	pointed	
a	gun	at	me.		That	evening,	my	brother	and	I	went	to	the	regional	police	to	ask	
about	our	 father’s	condition,	and	they	told	us	not	to	worry.	 	We	had	to	 look	 for	
him	three	days	until	we	found	him	at	the	district	hospital.”	
50	 Surat Perintah Penangkap,	August	9,	 2001,	 signed	by	 the	director	of	POLSEK	
Pasaman.	
51	 See	Note	16.	
52	 The	situation	 in	 Indonesia	 jails	even	after	 the	Reform	era	 is	not	much	different	
from	conditions	under	Suharto’s	New	Order.	See	http://www.hrw.org/reports/
pdfs/i/indonesa/indonesi908.pdf.	
53	 According	to	Mr.	ZUL,	six	people	were	 imprisoned	 in	a	small	 room	which	had	
Narihisa	NAKASHIMA
Hosei University Repository
11
no	bathroom,	so	a	terrible	stench	filled	the	room.	Each	prisoner	was	given	only	a	
handful	of	rice	two	times	a	day	with	sambal,	or	chili	sauce,	and	a	boiled	egg	to	be	
shared	among	six	prisoners.		
54	 Surat Kerapatan Adat Nagari Kapar (Kan)-Pasaman perhal: Menanggapi Surat 
KOMNASHAM tanggal 21 Juli 2000,	August	19,	2000.	
55	 Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia	(National	Committee	of	Human	Right).	
56	 The	points	are	as	 follows;	 (1)	BJL	and	his	 friends	sold	3500	hectares	of	Kapar	
communal	land	to	people	outside	Kapar.	(2)	BJL	and	his	friends	sold	the	remaining	
200	hectares,	too.	(3)	BJL	used	some	Kapar	residents	to	threaten	other	villagers.	(4)	
The	local	police	were	supporting	BJL.	
57	 Surat tentang Tanggapan Atas Laporan Sdr Saper Ke LBH Padang Sehubungan 
Dengan Isi Berita Majalah TEMPO,	August	2,	2000.
58	 See	note	20.
59	 Surat Putusan Perhal: Mencabut Pernyataan Permohonan Kasasi	 tanggal	 16	
Pebruari	 2007,	 Pengadilan	Negari	 Lubuksikaping,	 PU.3-LES/P3/I/10-3-2008,	
January	31,	2008.	
60	 An	 instructive	past	 incident	was	 that	 of	 the	Kapalo-Hilalang	 communal	 land	
struggle.		Their	communal	land	was	used	for	a	rubber	plantation	since	the	1910s.	
After	 Indonesian	 independence	 the	rubber	plantation	was	managed	by	civilian	
managers	and	veterans,	but	the	military	command	of	Padang	arrested	the	leaders	
of	 the	plantation	management	 in	1965	as	suspected	Communists	and	seized	the	
plantation.	 	After	Suharto’s	 fall,	due	 to	a	surge	 in	sentiment	 in	 favor	of	people	
reclaiming	their	communal	land,	the	military	management	of	the	rubber	plantation	
suffered	dramatic	decreases	 in	profit.	 	As	a	result,	 the	rubber	company	became	
unable	to	pay	HGU	fees	to	the	government,	so	BPN	appropriated	the	HGU	from	
the	military	run	company,	and	transferred	management	authority	to	the	regional	
government	of	Padang-Pariaman	District.		See	Nakashima	(2007a).		A	similar	case	
was	that	of	a	communal	land	struggle	in	Solok	District.		A	matrilineal	linage	in	the	
village	of	Guguk	claimed	the	right	of	communal	land	of	the	lineage	which	had	been	
used	as	a	coffee	plantation	since	the	Dutch	colonial	era.		The	lineage	had	proof	that	
the	land	has	been	leased	to	a	Dutch	company,	but	the	regional	government	seized	
the	coffee	plantation	in	1965,	then	BPN	issued	an	HGU	to	a	private	company	for	
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managing	the	plantation.		After	the	bankruptcy	of	the	company,	BPN	transferred	
the	HGU	to	another	company.		The	lineage	assumed	that	the	HGU	from	colonial	
times	had	already	expired	 in	1990,	 so	 they	claimed	rights	over	 the	plantation.	
The	members	of	the	matrilineal	linage	have	since	been	fighting	BPN	fruitlessly	to	
recover	their	land.	See	Nakashima	(2003).	
61	 See	(Jiwan	and	Andiko,	2008).
62	 Ali	 is	a	common	 Indonesian	name,	and	Baba	means	Chinese.	 	The	 Indonesian	
generals	visited	Chinese	companies	once	a	month	or	so	for	monetary	favors,	and	
they	were	often	paid	 large	bribes	 to	ensure	 that	 the	Chinese	business	people	
would	receive	favorable	treatment	from	the	Suharto	Government.	
63	 In	Losing Ground,	 the	authors	pointed	out	 that	 “Conflict	 is	also	 fuelled	by	 the	
police,	military	and	militias’	pursuit	of	their	own	interests.”	(Friends	of	the	Earth,	
Life	Mosaic	and	Sawit	Watch,	2008:	44)
64	 In	2008	Nagari	Mungo	elected	a	new	nagari	mayor	who	promised	 to	solve	 the	
issue.	 	He	has	been	trying	very	hard,	but	the	state-run	company	has	seemingly	
rejected	him,	and	he	has	not	been	invited	to	attend	their	more	important	meetings.
65	 See	Nakashima	(2007b).
66	 Drinking	beer	is	allowed	in	West	Sumatra,	but	imbibing	strong	alcohol,	including	
whiskey,	gin	and	vodka,	 is	 strictly	 forbidden	by	 Islamic	 law.	 	However,	 these	
prohibited	spirits	are	easily	obtainable	on	 the	black	market.	 	Gambling	mainly	
denotes	playing	dominoes	and	cock	fighting.	 	As	 for	prostitution,	 it	has	become	
more	common	due	to	the	presence	of	imported	workers	on	the	plantation,	who	are	
70%	men	and	live	in	isolated	barracks	on	the	grounds.		Each	month	on	the	major	
payday,	many	people	come	to	 the	markets	on	the	plantation,	and	some	women,	
both	married	and	single,	are	 involved	 in	prostitution.	 	The	 local	people	say	that	
they	are	mainly	Javanese	and	Batak.	
67	 The	original	Indonesian	is,	“Uang hantu dimakan Setan.”
68	 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia	 (the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia’s	
Revolutionary	Government)	
69	 Rights	 to	 the	 communal	 land	 of	Kapalo	Hilalang	 after	 the	 struggle	 remain	
ambiguous.	 	Any	villager	can	cultivate	any	crops,	 and	 there	appear	 to	be	no	
effective	governing	regulations	or	organizations	for	managing	the	land.		
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70	 I	 owe	 this	 information	 to	ELSPATT	 (Institute	of	Sustainable	Agriculture	and	
Rural	Livelihood),	Bogor.
71	 See	(Stoler,	1995:	Chapter	7).
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